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AFRICAN "RENAISSANCE" AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
Hunter R. Clark*
A foutra for the world and worldlings base!
I speak of Africa and golden joys.'
I. INTRODUCTION
President Bill Clinton made history when he stepped onto the tarmac at
Kotoka International Airport outside Accra, the capital of Ghana, in March
1998. His visit, the first by a U.S. President to any of the six states he
toured over an 11-day period, marked a turning point in economic relations
between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa.2 To paraphrase an astronaut, the
President's one small step onto African soil was a giant leap toward
establishing a trade policy aimed at ending what one observer has called
"Africa's invisibility" to U.S. investors.
3
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979; A.B.,
cum laude, Harvard College, 1976.
' WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY IV act 5, sc. 3.
2 Sub-Saharan Africa, also known as the African subcontinent, or simply as the sub-
Sahara, refers to the region below the Sahara Desert. The 48 sub-Saharan nations are:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkino Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Werde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3 See Salih Booker, Is This the End of Africa's Invisibility?, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998,
at Cl.
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To the pulsating beat of African drums, Ghana's president Jerry Rawlings
introduced the President to a wildly enthusiastic crowd of up to a half-
million admirers gathered in Accra's Independence Square.4 Clinton told
the assembled throng, "I am proud to be the first American President ever
to visit Ghana. And to go on to Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana,
and Senegal. It is a journey long overdue. America should have done it
before, and I am proud to be on that journey."' The President also told his
hosts, "I want to build a future partnership between our two people, and I
want to introduce the people of the United States through my trip, to the new
face of Africa."6
That new face, according to Clinton, is of a continent poised for what he
called a "new African renaissance."7 He declared:
With a new century coming into view, old patterns are
fading away: The Cold War is gone; colonialism is gone;
apartheid is gone. Remnants of past troubles remain. But
surely, there will come a time when everywhere reconcilia-
tion will replace recrimination. Now, nations and individu-
als finally are free to seek a newer world where democracy
and peace and prosperity are not slogans but the essence of
a new Africa.
Africa has changed so much in just 10 years. Dictator-
ship has been replaced [in] so many places. Half of the 48
nations in sub-Saharan Africa choose their own govern-
ments, leading a new generation willing to learn from the
past and imagine a future. Though democracy has not yet
gained a permanent foothold even in most successful
nations, there is everywhere a growing respect for tolerance,
diversity and elemental human rights.8
4 See John F. Harris, Clinton Hails "African Renaissance," WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1998,
at Al.5Remarks to the People of Ghana in Accra, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 483, 484
(Mar. 23, 1998).
6 Id. at 484.
Id. The use of the term "new African Renaissance" to describe the African subcontin-
ent's current state of affairs has been attributed by the White House to South African Deputy
Prime Minister Thabo Mbeki. See Press Briefing by Sandy Berger on Africa Trip, Mar. 20,
1998, available in WESTLAW, PRES-DAILY Database, 1998 WL 125106, at *2. Samuel
R. "Sandy" Berger is White House National Security Adviser.
8 Remarks to the People of Ghana in Accra, supra note 5, at 484.
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He went on to observe, "[A] decade ago, business was stifled. Now,
Africans are embracing economic reform. Today from Ghana to Mozam-
bique, from Cote d'Ivoire to Uganda, growing economies are fueling a
transformation in Africa."9 According to the President, that transformation
has made Africa ripe for trade and U.S. investment.'"
The first part of this article will examine the Clinton administration's
African trade policy and the validity of the assumptions upon which it is
based. Foremost among these assumptions is that sub-Saharan Africa is
poised for a renaissance inspired by a new generation of leaders who are
committed to democratization and economic growth in accordance with free
market principles. The administration believes that this renaissance is best-
nurtured to the mutual benefit of the U.S. and Africa through trade and
private investment policies that emphasize African democratization and
overall political, social, and economic reform. This is a dramatic departure
from past policies that focused primarily on Africans' value as strategic
proxies or pawns, instead of on the continent's potential for joint partnership
in the world economic community.
The six states that the President visited in March and April of 1998-Bot-
swana, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda-were evidently
selected because of their exemplary willingness to commit to the goals the
administration would like to see other African states pursue. Eventually, the
U.S. would like to see its bilateral relationship with South Africa used as a
model for its relations with all the states of the region as South Africa's
president Nelson Mandela has made an express commitment to combine
democratization with economic development, foreign investment, and trade.
The second part of this article will analyze competing assertions and
criticisms concerning the African trade bill passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1998. The bill sparked controversy at home and in
Africa. The President's domestic critics complained that his trip to Africa
was little more than a cynical attempt to use African trade policy to solidify
his support among wealthy democratic donors, and to woo members of the
9 Id. Tense moments followed Clinton's address when he descended the dais to shake
hands with frenzied well-wishers. Some in the crowd surged through police barriers in an
attempt to touch or get a closer view of the U.S. President. According to one eye witness
account, "The rush toward him caused some people to get crushed. 'Get back!' Clinton
shouted fiercely. 'Back off!' " Harris, supra note 4.
"0 See, e.g., John F. Harris & Lynne Duke, Clinton's Goal in Africa: Changing
Perceptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Congressional Black Caucus to vote against his impeachment." Mean-
while, both African and African American leaders criticized the administra-
tion for allegedly minimizing African nations' need for continued foreign aid
and debt relief. 2
Special attention will be devoted to the divisions that the administration's
African trade policy has caused within the African American community.
Finally, the article will also recommend ways in which U.S. trade and
investment policy toward Africa should be modified or adjusted to more
realistically reflect goals that are economically and politically feasible.
II. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN TRADE POLICY
The Clinton administration's sub-Saharan African trade policy was
embodied in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (the "African trade
bill"), which the U.S. House of Representatives approved on March 11,
1998." The U.S. Senate also considered its own versions of the bill.'4
The 105th Congress adjourned before final action could be taken on the
legislation and hence the House-approved version of the bill died. 5 A new
African trade bill has, however, been reintroduced in the 106th House.' 6
If enacted, it would accomplish many of the original bill's objectives, but at
this writing its passage is not by any means assured. In the meantime, the
Clinton administration has moved to implement as much of its African trade
policy as can be effectuated without Congressional approval.' 7  This is
" See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Editorial, Clinton apology the usual sham, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 18, 1998, at 20; infra p. 289.
12 See infra pp. 297, 305-306.
'3 See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. (1998).
'4 See S. 778, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2400, 105th Cong. tit. 1 (1998).
"5 For a discussion of the need to reintroduce House measures that have not been finally
acted upon by a Congress prior to its adjournment, see Bruce Ackerman, Editorial, Lame-
Duck Impeachment? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998:
As a constitutional matter, the House is not a continuing body. When
the 105th House closes up shop, all its unfinished business dies with it.
For example, a bill passed by the 105th House but still pending in the
Senate on Jan. 3 [1999] cannot be adopted unless it meets the approval
of the 106th House as well.
16 See H.R. 434, 106th Cong. (1999).
"7 See Senate Passage of African Trade Bill Remains Priority, AFR. NEWS SERV., Sept.
30, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, 1998 WL 21348108 (statement of
Witney Schneidman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs).
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possible because the President enjoys wide discretion and authority in the
foreign relations arena.'
8
The African trade bill was structured around five overall objectives:
increased trade between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa; increased U.S.
investment in the sub-Sahara; the development of the sub-Sahara's private
sector; the enhancement or revitalization of the region's infrastructure; and
sub-Saharan political and economic reform. 9 The African trade bill called
for, among other things:
(1) Creation of a joint U.S.-sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic
Cooperation Forum that would bring U.S. and African cabinet level officials
together on a regular basis to discuss the removal of trade barriers between
the U.S. and sub-Saharan states.2'
(2) Elimination of U.S. import quotas on African textiles.2'
(3) Extension of import tariff concessions to African states under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for a ten year period, thereby
increasing African access to U.S. markets.22
(4) Establishment, under the auspices of the Overseas Private Investment
i8 The U.S. Constitution explicitly assigns to Congress authority to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8. In practice, however, Congress has over
the years delegated vast authority over international economic relations to the President.
"These delegations, embodied in numerous statutes enacted over decades, often are so general
and ambiguous as to give the President considerable freedom to act." JOHN H. JACKSON Er
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 134 (3d ed. 1995). For an
excellent discussion of the foreign commerce power, see Theresa Wilson, Who Controls
International Trade: Congressional Delegation of the Foreign Commerce Power, 47 DRAKE
L. REv. 141 (1998).
'9 See H.R. 1432, supra note 13, § 2.
20 See id. § 6(a)-(c).
21 See id. § 8(a)-(c).
22 See id. § 9. The U.S. GSP is embodied in Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Title
V"), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994). Title V grants the President power to
designate for duty-free treatment certain goods imported by the U.S. from nations defined as
developing countries under Title V. GSP policy is designed to give developing nations'
imports an advantage over similar goods imported from developed countries. This advantage
is intended to assist developing countries by off-setting their export industries' high start-up
costs.
The problem for the Africans at the time of Clinton's visit was that textiles were considered
"import sensitive articles" under Title V and hence could not be designated for duty-free
treatment. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b) (1994). Also, the entire U.S. GSP duty-free scheme was
scheduled to expire on June 30, 1998. See 19 U.S.C. § 2465 (1994).
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Corporation (OPIC), of two investment funds.23 One, a half-billion dollar
infrastructure investment fund, would be used to finance infrastructure
improvements in Africa, such as the building of roads, bridges, railways,
power plants, and telecommunications networks.24 The other, a $150
million equity fund, would be used to encourage American small businesses
to invest in Africa.'
(5) Taking the first, formative steps toward the creation of a U.S.-Africa
free-trade zone.26
(6) Creation of a new position of Deputy Trade Representative for Africa
within the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative who would be devoted
full-time to U.S.-African trade matters.2 7
The trade bill's chief supporters insisted that African economic growth is
manifestly in the U.S. national interest." They defined that interest
primarily in terms of American investment opportunities and jobs.29
23 See H.R. 1432, supra note 13, § 11.
24 See id. § lI(b)(3)(B).
25 See id. § ll(b)(3)(A).
26 See id. § 7.
27 See id. § 13.
2 See A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa (last
modified Feb. 20, 1997) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/africa/1997/index.html> at "Introduc-
tion."
29 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. H1040, H1040 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Manzullo). Representative Manzullo stated:
Let me give my colleagues a taste of what can happen. Last year I
held a hearing before the Subcommittee on Small Business Exports,
which I chair, on the subject of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, OPIC. A wonderful lady born in Africa and now residing
in Massachusetts, Monique Maddy, testified how her small telecommuni-
cations fu-m was able to contribute both to economic development in
Africa and increased U.S. exports to Africa.
She won a deal, thanks to a political risk insurance package from
OPIC, to build wireless public telephones which operate on debit cards
instead of coins for Tanzania. This contract resulted in the export of $4.5
million worth of goods and services from 8 supplier companies in 7
States: Texas, New Jersey, Washington, Georgia, Missouri, and North
Carolina. In addition, 60 jobs were created in Tanzania.
Because the African Communications Group did so well with the
Tanzania sale, Ms. Maddy subsequently won a larger sale to Ghana with
OPIC's help. This will result in the export of approximately $65 million
worth of goods and services from the United States and create 500 jobs
in Ghana. Without OPIC, most likely these deals would have gone to our
[Vol. 27:265
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However, the strategic and humanitarian advantages of a partnership with
Africa were not overlooked. For example, during the President's stay in
Ghana, White House National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger
stated at a press briefing:
We have a growing stake in Africa's success. It is a
market of 700 million people with trade to Africa already 20
percent greater than our trade to the former Soviet Union;
100,000 Americans' jobs are directly tied to exports to
Africa. But we have far from realized the full potential.
Our trade with Africa is only 1 percent of all U.S. trade; 7
percent of Africa's imports are American. So there are
clearly economic opportunities there.
But just as important, perhaps more important, strategical-
ly and from a humanitarian perspective, stability in Africa
based upon evolving democracy, respect for human rights,
[and] sustainable development will make an enormous
difference for the United States. It's the difference between
having partners with whom we can tackle common challeng-
es, from drugs and disease to the environment, and failed
states that are thrown into tragic chaos.
We spent, for example, $2.2 billion in our military
humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, a failed state that
imploded. The more that we can help to contribute to
stability in Africa, the better off we will be.3"
European competitors.
My home State of Illinois is another example of the phenomenal
growth of exports to Africa. South Africa alone is Illinois's 20th largest
export destination, totaling $389 million for 1996. The leading exports
to South Africa are industries where Illinois excels: chemical, earth-
moving equipment, agricultural machinery, and aviation parts.
From the Chicago-land area, exports to South Africa grew 148 percent
between 1993 and 1996, starting at $74 million and increasing to $184
million. In Rockford, Illinois, exports to South Africa grew 29 percent,
jumping from $2 million in 1994 to $2.6 million in 1995, the latest date
for which we have export statistics.
Id.
3 Press Briefing by Sandy Berger on Africa Trip, supra note 7, at *1-*2. According to
the U.S. Department of Commerce, international trade in the U.S. amounted to roughly $622.8
billion in exports, and $791.3 billion in imports, during 1996, the most recent year for which
the statistics are available. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
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The trade bill's supporters were absolutely unwilling to concede Africa's
markets to other foreign suppliers, despite the competition's early lead. By
the administration's estimate, the 6.7% market share which the U.S. claims
in the region lags significantly behind the 7.2% share enjoyed by Japan, or
the 30% share of the European Union (EU).3' Nevertheless, according to
Chester A. Crocker, Director of the Corporate Council on Africa and a
former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan
Administration:
Africa is the second-fastest growing region in the world,
if you take it in aggregate. There is opportunity for Ameri-
can exporters in a whole series of fields like, for example,
agricultural equipment, transportation equipment, ag[ricultur-
al] research, eco-tourism, mining, petroleum, of course, the
basic industries of Africa. There are jobs for Americans in
Africa, if Africa gets on its feet.32
The privatization of the subcontinent's telecommunications enterprises
holds particular promise, some of which already is being realized by U.S.
companies. 3  For example, SBC Communications, a so-called "Baby Bell"
based in San Antonio, Texas, acquired an 18% share of Telkom, South
Africa's state-run company. 4 The decision to partially privatize Telkom
(the South African government retained a 70% interest in the firm) was
based on the appeal of "reduced tariffs, extra calls and higher tax revenues
that have followed such moves in other countries. 35  If current market
trends are an accurate indication, SBC stands to profit handsomely,
especially from the growing South African consumer demand for mobile
phones. The Economist reported:
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, 656 (117th ed. 1997).
31 See A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa, supra
note 28.
32 Interview by John McLaughlin with Chester A. Crocker, Professor, Georgetown
University, on John McLaughlin's One on One (WRC-TV, Washington, D.C., television
broadcast, Mar. 14-15, 1998) (transcript available from the Federal News Service).
" See supra note 29.
34 See VeldCom, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 64.
35 id.
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The bright spot for Telkom is mobiles. Since 1993, when
the devices were first licensed, the number of users has
rocketed from 12,500 to about 1.6m, making South Africa
one of the world's largest markets for mobile phones outside
the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development]. In a country where public phones are almost
non-existent (people steal them for their value as scrap
metal), the cellphone is a must for the well-off and a status
symbol for everyone else. Nervous drivers like to know
they can call for help if they break down somewhere
dangerous. A recent letter to the Sowetan raged against
immoral township girls who sleep with any man who owns
a mobile phone.
Telkom is one of two mobile providers. It is a partner of
Britain's Vodafone in a joint venture called Vodacom, which
claims a million subscribers. Its estimated pre-tax profits
are 500m rand ($100m) on sales of perhaps 1.8 billion rand
[$360 million]. MTN, the other mobile firm, with fewer
customers, but wealthier ones, probably has similar reve-
nues. The good times are likely to continue, even after a
third mobile license is granted this year, probably to a black-
owned consortium with foreign partners.36
In addition to creating jobs, investment, and other opportunities for
Americans, the trade bill was designed to help transform Africa by
permanently changing the way business and politics are conducted. By
increasing U.S. trade and investment, the legislation intended to provide
Africans with a measure of prosperity, while at the same time making
African countries less vulnerable to the whims or dictates of foreign aid
donors.
Furthermore, the measure was seen by at least one of its backers as "a first
step toward replacing aid with trade, with starting Africa on the road to
catching up with other regions of the world in economic development."37
6 id.
17 Mimi Hall, Clinton Will Showcase Emerging Africa, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 1998, at
4A (quoting Illinois Republican Congressman Phil Crane, Chairman of the House of
Representatives Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee). See also 144 CONG. REC. H1040,
H1056 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamilton). Representative Hamilton
stated:
By helping move African nations and the United States away from
1999]
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The legislation's "trade, not aid" approach comes at a time when U.S.
domestic political support for foreign aid programs is dwindling.3" U.S.
humanitarian aid to Africa peaked in 1994 at $1.3 billion.39 Since then, it
has declined to about $700 million annually.40
donor-recipient relationships, and toward economic partnership, the bill
will strengthen bilateral political ties.
By promoting growth, the bill will bolster political stability and give
African nations the wherewithal to address environmental crime, health,
and other problems of mutual concern.
Id.
38 See, e.g., SMITH HEMPSTONE, ROGUE AMBASSADOR: AN AFRICAN MEMOIR (1997),
reprinted in Dan Connell & Frank Smith, Africa's New Bloc, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998,
at 80, 88 (1998):
Before World War II, there was no such thing as foreign aid. The
colonial powers-Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal,
Spain, and Italy (Germany had lost its overseas possessions at the end of
World War I)-were responsible for the administration and development
of their colonies. Occasionally, the United States or American banks
made loans to small, destitute countries within their sphere of influence,
and, in the case of Haiti, had no compunction about sending in the
Marines to collect what was owed.
But foreign aid as we know it today was a product of the Cold War,
when the United States and the Soviet Union vied with one another to
buy clients on every continent. It is not clear that Washington or
Moscow got its money's worth. The former colonial powers in Europe
at least managed to preserve a degree of influence and a mercantile edge.
But the United States, which lavished more than $400 billion abroad,
could only get Third World nations to vote with it in the United Nations
about 15 percent of the time.
Id.
Nevertheless, Hempstone, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya during the Bush
Administration, concludes that foreign aid can still play a role that benefits the U.S. He
writes:
Food aid, while it may not encourage development, enables us to
dispense food surpluses, salve our consciences, and provide some
employment for Americans, while also saving lives. Development aid can
help create healthier societies abroad, contribute to overseas sale of
American products, and again, create at least a few jobs at home. Even
a small amount of military aid, the hardest kind of assistance to justify,
helps to keep the military establishments of the world on our side.
The trick is to get the right mix.
Id. at 88-89.
39 See John F. Harris & Lynne Duke, Clinton's Goal in Africa: Changing Perceptions,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al.
4 See id.
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The EU has also expressed a reluctance to provide Africa with aid. For
example, the Lome IV Convention,1 which is the basis for the trade and
development relationship between the EU and the developing African,
Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP") states, expires early in the year 2000.42
The EU has stated its desire to restructure the Lome framework in a way that
will produce what EU Development Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro
has called "a more adult relationship" between the EU and the ACP.
43
Such a relationship would mean "more mutual trade and less economic
dependency."44
In order to achieve this result, the EU plans to make aid and preferential
trade arrangements with the ACP states dependent upon democratization,
equality for women, and improved financial management in the ACP
countries.45 As Commissioner Pinheiro put it, "where countries produce
good [democratic] results, they will be better supported."'  In addition to
the preferential market access they have been accorded, EU aid to ACP
countries is expected to total some $13 billion over the five-year period
1995-2000.47
The House version of the African trade bill explicitly called upon sub-
Saharan states to implement economic and political reform; establish market
incentives and private sector growth; eradicate poverty; and recognize the
"importance of women to economic growth and development."48 Achieving
the last two goals-eradicating poverty and, in effect, according women
equal rights-would radically alter the social structure of traditional African
societies where tremendous wealth disparities are commonplace, and women
have been customarily relegated to subservient status.
The economic reforms which the African trade bill encouraged are
41 See Fourth ACP/EEC Convention of Lome ("Lome IV Convention"), Dec. 15, 1989,
29 I.L.M. 783 (1990).
42 See id. For a discussion of Lome IV, see Douglas E. Matthews, Lome IV and
ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Decade, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991/1992).
43 Private Ownership and Innovation Enshrined in New Negotiating Brief, EUROPEAN
REP., Feb. 7, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Database, 1998 WL 8800532.
4id.
41 See id.
46Id.
17 See Shada Islam, Europe Prepares to Negotiate New Development Treaty with Poor
Nations, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 29, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS-
PLUS Database.
48 H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
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consistent with long-standing U.S. international investment policy. As
enunciated by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, that policy is premised on
the assumption that "an open international investment system responding to
market forces provides the most efficient mechanism to promote global
economic development."4 9 (Emphasis added.) With its emphasis on free
market principles, the U.S. view has consistently been that "[g]overnment
intervention in the international allocation of investment resources can retard
economic growth," and in fact tends to do so.5" In accordance with these
principles, the African trade bill aimed to reduce or limit the role of
government in Africa's developing economies; to promote the privatization
of inefficient state-run industries; and to ensure national treatment for foreign
investors and the prevention of illegal expropriation of property.
The trade bill promoted the idea of democratization, defined broadly as
adherence to the rule of law, representative government, and respect for
human rights. 1 From its inception, the U.S. has asserted that the legitimate
exercise of government power derives from the consent of the governed,
expressed through democratic mechanisms that allow for full participation
in the political process. The failure or refusal to provide truly representative
government gives impetus to what James Madison called the "violence of
faction," which undermines social, political, and economic stability.52 An
unstable climate is not conducive to investment.
According to Madison, liberty has many advantages, including a "tendency
to break and control the violence of faction."53 Therefore, in the U.S. view,
representative democracy is the most effective means of creating the type of
stable climate in which private investors prosper. Generally speaking,
President Clinton has asserted that "stability in the 21st century will require
high levels of freedom. ''m More specifically in regard to the sub-Sahara,
the administration's position is that "democratization is underway in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and its success is crucial for economic development and
49 Statement on International Investment Policy, II PUB. PAPERS 1243, 1246 (Sept. 9,
1983).
5 Id.
"' See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 105 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1892).
" Id. at 104.
54 Press Availability with Presidents Clinton and Jiang, June 27, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, PRES-DAILY Database, 1998 WL 345136, *10.
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political stability in the region. 55 In short, the administration believes that
democratization and economic development are linked inextricably.
Therefore, the African trade bill proposed eligibility requirements designed
to promote African political reform. Under the trade bill's eligibility
provisions, the President would have made two affirmative determinations
regarding any sub-Saharan state that applied for programs, projects, or
financial assistance under the bill. The first would have been that the
country in question "does not engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights."56 The second would have been that the applicant
state "has established, or is making continual progress toward establishing,
a market-based economy. 57
Factors indicating the satisfaction of these eligibility criteria included: the
protection of private property against expropriation; a "fair judicial system";
according national treatment to foreign investors and "other measures to
create an environment conducive to foreign investment"; elimination of
government corruption; minimal government intervention in the market
through such devices as price controls or subsidies; support for the growth
of the private sector, including a "new generation of African entrepreneurs";
and adherence to the rule of law, including equal protection, due process, and
the right to a fair trial.58
The Clinton administration's policy has already achieved some measure
of acceptance among African leaders. At the Entebbe Summit for Peace and
Prosperity that was part of his visit to Uganda, the President joined the rulers
of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda in signing a joint
declaration of principles with the stated objective of putting into practice
their new partnership. The leaders issued a joint communiqu6 which
endorsed the African Growth and Opportunity Act as a "major step forward
in U.S.-African economic relations. '59 The communiqu6 also recognized
that stability depends on the "sustainability of African democratization," and
endorsed "the core principles of inclusion, the rule of law, respect for human
rights, the equality of all men and women, and the right of citizens to
" A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa, supra
note 28, at subsection "Goal of Administration's Trade and Development Policy".
'6 H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
57 id.
" See id.
'9 Communique: Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 498 (Mar. 25, 1998).
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regularly elect their leaders freely and to participate in the decision-making
which affects them. '' 0
The Entebbe joint communiqu6 is more than merely a symbolic achieve-
ment; it embodies unilateral declarations that are binding on the signatory
states under international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
ruled that a state may be legally bound by its own declarations given
publicly with the intention of being bound by the declarations' terms. This
is certainly what appears to be the case in regard to the declarations
contained in the Entebbe joint communiqu6. The ICJ expressed itself clearly
on this point when it declared in the Nuclear Tests cases that:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may
have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of
this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is
the intention of the State making the declaration that it
should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of legal undertaking,
the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration.6'
III. THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND AFRICAN TRADE POLICY
In regard to the treatment of women, certain practices that are widespread
throughout the sub-Sahara, such as female circumcision and polygyny,62
appall western sensibilities.
The term "female circumcision" refers to "a variety of genital operations
[e.g., clitoridectomy] performed in traditional societies, generally as part of
an initiation ritual. The operations involve excising varying portions of the
female genitalia, depending on the custom of the practicing society." 63
60 Id. at 501.
61 Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 638-39 (4th ed. 1990).
62 For the purposes of this article, the terms "polygyny" and "polygamy" are used
interchangeably to refer to the practice of having two or more wives or concubines at the
same time.63 Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights
Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 L. & INEQ. J. 367, 367 n.1 (1989).
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Female circumcision has been practiced for over 2,500 years." Today,
it is prevalent in approximately 40 nations, 28 of which are in Africa.
65
The practice is common in such disparate regions as Malaysia, Indonesia,
southern parts of the Arabian peninsula, Pakistan, parts of the former Soviet
Union, Oman, Bahrain, South Yemen, Peru, Brazil, eastern Mexico, and
among the Australian aborigines, but is most prevalent in the Middle East
and Africa.66 By one estimate, a majority of the two million girls who are
at risk of being circumcised each year live in Africa.67 The practice not
only causes intense pain but carries with it grievous medical and psychologi-
61cal consequences.
Nevertheless, efforts to eradicate female circumcision in the African
subcontinent have for the most part failed.69 Adult women as well as men
in emerging nations reject being "dictated to" in regard to their customs by
former colonial powers they regard as insensitive to their long-standing
cultural traditions.70 As one scholar has observed:
Given the history of Western colonialism in many of the
nations in which [female] circumcision is practiced, this
perception of imperialism is especially offensive. African
feminists have often reacted with bitter resentment to non-
Africans' condemnation of the practice. Clearly, ethnocen-
tric eradication efforts which devalue the intelligence and
cultural integrity of a different community will provoke
resistance to, rather than facilitate, change. Thus, reformers
must avoid alienating their audience and must recognize that
manipulation of women's bodies is not unique to African
cultures but occurs in Western cultures as well.7 '
4 See Erika Sussman, Contending With Culture: An Analysis of the Female Genital
Mutilation Act of 1996, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 193, 197 (1998).
63 See id.
66 See Brennan, supra note 63, at 373 n.3.
67 See Sussman, supra note 64, at 197.
"See Brennan, supra note 63, at 379-80.
69 For a discussion of past attempts to limit female circumcision in Africa, see Sussman,
supra note 64, at 237-242.
70 See Brennan, supra note 63, at 375-79; Sussman, supra note 64, at 211-15.
7 Sussman, supra note 64, at 212-213 [citations omitted].
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Those who defend female circumcision assert that it serves legitimate and
desirable social purposes, such as promoting wifely fidelity and preparing
adolescent females to endure the future pain of childbirth.72 Based on past
experience, human rights activists fear that outlawing female circumcision
would only drive the practice underground where it could thrive unmonitored
with no outside control over safety and sanitation.73
At the same time, cultural proponents of polygyny justify it as protective
of women. Among other things, they assert that the practice of polygyny
assists in the accumulation of wealth, allows women to share the burdens of
child-rearing, and ensures postpartum celibacy so that women can space their
child-bearing. 74
Another example of an African custom which affronts Western sensibili-
ties is the "reed dance," practiced by the Zulu and Swazi tribes in South
Africa. The reed dance is an annual ritual during which tribal kings choose
virgin child brides from among thousands of scantily clad pubescent girls.75
72 See Brennan, supra note 63, at 374, 389.
73 See Brennan, supra note 63, at 397. The practice has, however, been outlawed in the
U.S. by the Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 116 (West Supp. 1998).
That act directs U.S. representatives to international financial institutions such as the World
Bank to vote against loans to nations with a known history of practicing female circumcision,
unless those nations have implemented educational programs designed to prevent the practice.
22 U.S.C.A. § 262K-2 (West Supp. 1998).
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice Board of Immigration Appeals has recognized
a young woman's fear of being circumcised by her tribe, the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of
northern Togo, as grounds for granting her asylum in the U.S. See In Re Fauziya Kasinga,
Interim Decision (BIA) 3278 (June 13, 1996), available in WESTLAW, FIM-BIA Database,
1996 WL 379826 (BIA).
7 See Brennan, supra note 63, at 370 n.14.
7 For a description of the reed dance by a reporter who recently observed the rite at the
Enyokeni Royal Residence in South Africa, see Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Zulu Virgins
Celebrate Their Bodies, Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at A3:
To Western eyes, it may seem odd that 2,000 girls who are here to be
sternly lectured about virginity are also heavily pressured to strip off
almost every stitch of their clothing.
But that's the reed dance.
And to the Zulu, the custom makes perfect sense. The proof that a
virgin is a virgin is that she is proud of her pure body. Some of the girls
dancing before King Goodwill Zwelithini recently even wore beadwork
aprons with the words "intombi nto"--"straight girl"-beaded into them.
The reed dance is a Zulu and Swazi rite of spring danced before the
King every September, when spring comes to the Southern Hemisphere.
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These sorts of customs and attitudes may explain why Africans were smug
about the sex scandals that surrounded Clinton at the time of his Africa visit.
As one columnist who accompanied the President noted dryly:
As Mr. Clinton traveled through Ghana and Uganda,
Africans were puzzled that Americans could be upset at their
President over something so trivial as adultery.
Polygamy, after all, is still widespread in some tribes.
And in a continent run by Big Men, both malign and
benign, nobody understands why the rules should be so strict
for the American Big Guy.76
Against this backdrop it comes as no surprise that entrepreneurial
opportunities for African women are limited by economic realities and
formal marketplace arrangements. Informal markets may hold greater
opportunity for women and for the realization of the gender participation
goal of the administration's African trade policy. Men dominate the
ownership and management of the lucrative "formal sectors" of the sub-
Saharan economies: large firms and small businesses. Because African
women often do not speak a European language and "generally have less
The 30-year-old King of nearby Swaziland held his on Sept. 4 [1998],
and chose his new wife from among the dancers--another royal privilege,
since the dance is also a kind of debutante ball.
Traditionally, young girls from all over the King's domain cut reeds to
present him for roofing his huts and lining his cattle pen. The sight is
glorious-hundreds of 5-foot girls bearing 25-foot reeds like lances,
pennant tops waving in the breeze, weaving slowly in dancing regiments,
the first formed entirely of princesses, up the road to the King's stockade.
The King, dressed in leopard skins, carrying a cowhide shield and gold
battle-ax and surrounded by his warriors, waits to meet them, kisses one
of his daughters and accepts the first reed from her while praise-singers
shout the family history to an awed knot of guests.
In the background, three oxen chosen for the night's feast are being
butchered, hunks of meat the size of car doors hanging on the corral
fence.
There are incongruous modem touches. The King wears expensive
Italian sandals, and one of his headmen is in Converse running shoes.
Id.
76 Maureen Dowd, Laws of the Jungles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at A5.
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education to qualify for formal sector employment, loans, or programs...
they are more likely to be informal sector traders and vendors."77
The informal economy has expanded throughout Africa, especially in
African countries where state control of the economy has been reduced or
eroded. Such expansion is advantageous to women as it allows women to
avoid discriminatory bureaucratic regulation. By contrast, the formal sector's
administrative apparatus, which grants licenses, approves bank loans, and
imposes burdensome accounting requirements, has been called a primary
"mechanism of male control over women. '78
But the informal sector "is not an ideal environment for doing business,
both because of limitations placed on it and because of its lack of official
support and methods of capital accumulation."79 Under these circumstanc-
es, women find it difficult to acquire enough capital to expand their
operations or improve their management skills. Also, their networks and
contacts are restricted to those engaged in other small-scale enterprises.
However, the fact that African women face discrimination has not kept
them from making crucial contributions to their economies. In fact, African
women are primarily responsible for the food supply to large urban areas,
such as Harare, Zimbabwe; Kinshasa, Congo; and Nairobi, Kenya, as well
as for provisioning their own households and villages.80 Unfortunately, the
significance and extent of their economic participation is understated or
overlooked. And while some progress has been made toward forging a sense
of female solidarity in order to confront economic and social inequities,
African working women, like their male counterparts, remain deeply divided
by ethnic rivalries and socioeconomic distinctions. Meanwhile, the male
political leadership-no African nation is governed by a woman-remains
for the most part unresponsive to African women's aspirations.
The African trade bill was designed to promote increased economic
opportunities for African women. In fact, one of the bill's stated purposes
was to support economic self-reliance for sub-Saharan states "committed to
[recognizing] ... the importance of women to economic growth and
" Anita Spring & Barbara E. McDade, Entrepreneurship in Africa: Traditional and
Contemporary Paradigms, in AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND REALITY 1, 16
(Spring & McDade eds., 1998).
78 Id. (citation omitted).
7 Id. (citations omitted).
s See id. (citations omitted).
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development. 8'  The bill did not, however, make specific provision for
accomplishing this goal. Nevertheless, the administration's commitment to
improving the status of women through its African trade policy has
succeeded in raising some sub-Saharan leaders' awareness of gender
inequalities. This is evidenced by the Entebbe joint communiqu6, which
recognizes the equality of men and women. 2 The extent to which African
women stand to benefit from an African trade policy that emphasizes gender
equality has already been demonstrated. 3
IV. DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
AFRICAN TRADE POLICY
The President's harshest domestic critics dismissed his African trade
initiative as a self-serving political maneuver. These critics saw the initiative
itself, as well as the timing of Clinton's Africa visit, as a cynical attempt to
shift the public's focus from the President's political scandals. However,
these critics overlook the fact that the formulation and timing of the
administration's African trade policy was directed by Congress, not by the
President.
In 1994, Congress responded to World Trade Organization ("WTO")
concerns about the "economic marginalization of some countries, particularly
those countries in Africa," by enacting section 134 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA").84 Section 134 of the URAA required the
President to "develop and implement a comprehensive trade and development
policy for the countries of Africa," and to report to Congress annually for
five years on progress made toward implementing that trade and develop-
ment policy.8 5 At the time, the U.S. effectively had no trade policy toward
Africa. 86
The required annual reports followed. 7 Then, on April 21, 1997, White
House and Congressional officials opened negotiations on legislation that
SI H.R. 1432, supra note 13, § 3(4).
82 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 29.
84 See Rochelle Jennings, Insider Briefing: Trade, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 20, 26
(1997) (remarks by Irving Williamson).
85 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 134, 19 U.S.C. 3554 (1994).
86 See Peter Baker, White House, Hill Seek New Trade Policy on Africa, WASH. POST,
Apr. 22, 1997, at A15.
87 See, e.g., A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa,
supra note 28.
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evolved into the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which passed the
House on the eve of the President's African departure.88 His trip, therefore,
was timed to coincide with House passage of the African trade bill, and the
need to promote the bill in the Senate, as well as to gain its acceptance
among African leaders.
Clinton's opponents also charged that the Africa trip had less to do with
trade and open investment than with solidifying the President's political
support among African Americans, one of his core constituencies, by
manipulating their sentiments about their ancestral homeland. To put it
bluntly, the President was accused of using the lure of lucrative trade deals
to buy black votes in Congress that could be used to defeat the impeachment
effort.
To support their assertions, the President's critics pointed to the number
of prominent African American business and political leaders included in the
presidential entourage, described by one reporter as the "most racially diverse
to accompany a U.S. President abroad." 9 In fact, Clinton's traveling group
included at least 16 members of the Congressional Black Caucus, which then
had 38 total members, 37 in the House and one in the Senate.9 Among
other notable blacks who accompanied the President were Reverend Jesse L.
Jackson, a two-time presidential contender who served unofficially as
Clinton's special envoy to Africa; former NAACP president Kweisi Mfume;
Denver mayor Wellington Webb; Ilyasah Shabazz, a Mount Vernon, New
York municipal official who is a daughter of the late Malcolm X; Alma
Brown, senior vice-president of Chevy Chase Bank and widow of the late
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown; and Robert L. Johnson, founder
of Black Entertainment Television and a major Democratic Party contribu-
tor.9
As further evidence that Clinton aimed to appease African Americans, his
critics pointed to the President's use of an Ugandan venue to issue what was
tantamount to an official apology for slavery. Some African American
leaders had in the past called upon the U.S. government to somehow redress
88 See Baker, supra note 86.
89 See John F. Harris, A Visit of Great Magnitude: President Clinton's African Entourage
a Multiethnic Multitude, WASH. PosT, Mar. 29, 1998, at A22.
90 See id.; Michael M. Phillips, Some Blacks are Torn by Africa Trade Bill: Legislation
Could Threaten Southern Textile Workers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at A2.
91 See Harris, supra note 89; R.W. Apple Jr., On Tour With Clinton: Business, Business,
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at A8.
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the wrongs that slavery, as well as the era of racial segregation that followed
it, perpetrated upon the African American people.
For example, Michigan congressman John Conyers, ranking Democrat on
the House Judiciary Committee and the President's point man against
chairman Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) in the committee's impeachment inquiry,
introduced legislation in January 1997 that, if adopted, would have
established a commission to determine reparations due the descendants of
slaves by the U.S. government.92 The bill envisioned a system by which
the U.S. would compensate African Americans for slavery in much the same
way that Germany has agreed to compensate victims of the Holocaust.93
During the President's stay in Uganda, Jesse Jackson went so far as to
imply that African countries might also be entitled to reparations for U.S.
slavery. At a press briefing in Uganda, Jackson told reporters, "Africa
subsidised American development. African labour, African raw materials,
Africans were commodities on the stock exchange. So much of America's
foundation rests with Africa. Africa is the creditor, America is the
debtor."'94 News accounts of Jackson's remarks did not state whether he
had quantified the present-day value of that subsidy, or the formula he would
use for calculating it. Presumably, such a calculation could serve as the
basis for negotiating reparations owed African states by the U.S., or owed
by the U.S. to individual African Americans who are descended of slaves.
As a moderate alternative to the Conyers bill, Congressman Tony P. Hall
(D-Ohio) in June 1997 proposed a simple apology in the form of House
Concurrent Resolution 96, a single, contrite sentence which read, "Resolved
by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress
apologizes to African-Americans whose ancestors suffered as slaves under
the Constitution and laws of the United States until 1865." ' When Hall
introduced the resolution, he explained,
It is a very simple idea. The Congress apologizes. It is
a powerful message.
92 See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40,
105th Cong. (1997).
" For a discussion of German reparations to Jewish Holocaust victims, see David Binder,
Germany to Pay Jewish Victims of Nazis, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7, 1992 at 3.
94 Peter Masebu, Jesse Jackson Says Clinton's Trip Improved Africa's Image, AFR. NEWS
SERV., Apr. 3, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, 1998 WL 10886916
(emphasis added).
95 See H.R. Con. Res. 96, 105th Cong. (1997).
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When a brother wrongs a brother, he apologizes. That is
the foundation for beginning again. That is the price for
restoring lost trust. This is the only way to start over. It is
a simple gesture. It carries deep meaning. And it is the
right thing to do.
When an institution wrongs a people, so it is again the
right thing to do. In the name of all Catholics, Pope John
Paul II apologized for violence during the 16th century
Counter-Reformation and he asked for forgiveness.
Forty years after the Holocaust, the legislature of East
Germany apologized for the atrocities committed against the
Jews.
Just last month, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
apologized for the failure of his country to fully respond to
the thousands of deaths during the Irish potato famine of the
mid-19th century.
It has been 134 years since slavery ended. Since that
time, Congress has taken proud strides forward, done some
wonderful things, including civil rights laws. But it is not
enough.6
Despite Hall's and Conyers's efforts, however, the Congressional Black
Caucus and major civil rights organizations have never considered the
question of reparations or an apology for slavery as important as other policy
initiatives.97
9 143 CONG. REC. H3890, H3891 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hall). For
a discussion of measures that may be demanded by way of apology under international law,
see BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 461. Brownlie only goes so far as to conclude that
"Measures demanded by way of apology should today take forms which are not humiliating
or excessive." Id. (citing ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-35
(1921)).
In addition to the apologies enumerated by Congressman Hall, Pope John Paul II in 1997
released a document entitled We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, an official apology
for the role the Roman Catholic Church played in the Holocaust. The apology was, however,
rejected as inadequate by Jewish groups that conduct formal relations with the Vatican. See
Hanna Rosin, Catholic Apology Inadequate, Jewish Groups Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998,
at A14.
9' See Courtland Milloy, An Apology Won't Settle This Debt, WASH. POST, June 22, 1997,
at B 1; see also James Bennet, In Uganda, Clinton Expresses Regret on Slavery in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
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Clinton's advisers were opposed even to an apology, fearing it would
alienate centrist white voters who object to the notion that they are somehow
responsible for slavery, which happened generations ago. 98
However, to the consternation of his opponents, Clinton was able to
minimize the domestic political impact of his slavery remarks. He couched
his words astutely in terms of a desire for improved relations with African
states based on a willingness to break with the discarded practices and
policies of the past. He linked slavery with other discredited policies such
as the expedient way in which the U.S. conducted the Cold War, often to the
detriment of emerging African states' interests, and the early U.S. support for
South African apartheid. The President went so far as to issue a blanket
apology for what he called U.S. "ignorance and neglect" of Africa."
In remarks he made to government officials, gathered with more than a
thousand schoolchildren in a meadow near the rural hamlet of Mukono,
Uganda, Clinton conceded:
It is as well not to dwell too much on the past, but I think
it is worth pointing out that the United States has not always
done the right thing by Africa. In our own time, during the
Cold War, when we were so concerned about being in
competition with the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with
countries in Africa and in other parts of the world based
more on how they stood in the struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the
struggle for their own people's aspirations to live up to the
fullest of their God-given abilities.
9 See Bennet, supra note 97. But see Milloy, supra note 97:
The Conyers commission would, no doubt, point out that it doesn't
matter whether white people came to these shores after slavery was
abolished. Virtually all white people, because of their race, benefited
from slavery. And no matter how poor they were when they came here,
they could always feel better about themselves because at least they
weren't black.
Only African Americans suffered about 300 years of slavery in
America, then were set free to endure psychological traumas that were
deliberately ignored and allowed to pass on through the generations. No
other group has endured a century of wholesale lynching, terrorism and
Jim Crow-style segregation in America-and then been told, after 30
years of civil rights legislation, that the playing field was level.
9 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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And, of course, going back to the time before we were
even a nation, European-Americans received thefruits of the
slave trade. And we were wrong in that, as well. Although,
I must say, if you look at the remarkable delegation we have
here from Congress, from our Cabinet and administration,
and from the citizens of America, there are many distin-
guished African-Americans who are in that delegation who
are making America a better place today.
But perhaps the worst sin America ever committed about
Africa was the sin of neglect and ignorance. We have never
been involved with you, in working together for our mutual
benefit, for your children and for ours, as we should have
been. °
In reporting the speech, The New York Times emphasized the domestic
implications of the President's slavery remarks. The Times pointed out that
West Africa, not the Ugandan region, was the "real center" of the 18th and
19th century slave trade.' Therefore, the newspaper concluded, Clinton's
remarks "seemed addressed as much to his audience back home as to those
who heard him speak... [in Uganda.]"' 2
Administration officials, for their part, were quick to downplay Clinton's
contrition. After all, as one pundit put it, "too much apologizing can make
the President look weak back home."' 3 Besides, in the view of some of
his advisers, emphasizing the past only detracted from the President's
preferred discussion of Africa's potential. One White House source
complained, "The problem is [the President] announces that we want to talk
about the new Africa, and those [slavery] comments are not about the
future."'" To quiet the impact of the President's pronouncements, Jesse
Jackson called Clinton's comments regarding slavery "statement enough on
that matter."'0 5 Jackson insisted, "The question is where shall we go from
here." 01
"® Remarks at the Kisowera School in Mukono, Uganda, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
490, 491 (March 24, 1998) (emphasis added).
"01 See Bennet, supra note 97.
102 id.
1
03 James Bennet, The World: Sorry About That; Africa Gets the Clinton Treatment, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, § 4, at 1.
104 Id.
105 Bennet, supra note 97.
106 id.
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The President's critics also complained that influential democratic party
contributors who traveled with Clinton stood to benefit financially from the
administration's African trade policy. In fact, Republican National
Committee chairman Jim Nicholson went so far as to label the President's
African excursion a "fund-raising safari." ' 7  These democratic party
donors included the likes of Maurice Tempelsman and Ron Burkle, both of
whom are white. Tempelsman made his fortune as a diamond trader, and is
reportedly well-connected to South Africa's DeBeers diamond syndicate.108
In both 1995 and 1996 he made six-figure contributions to the demo-
crats."3 9 Burkle is a Los Angeles, California supermarket executive who
is also a six-figure Democratic party donor."' He has in the past loaned
his Beverly Hills mansion to Clinton for fund-raising events."
At a press briefing in Cape Town, South Africa, White House press
secretary Michael D. McCurry dismissed these and other Republican
complaints. As to the inclusion of Democratic party contributors in the
Clinton entourage, he admitted, "Obviously some of them are political
contributors."' 1 2 But, he added, "Some of them contribute to the Republi-
can Party in excess to what they contribute to the Democratic Party.""' 3
McCurry went on to defend the racial composition of the President's travel
group, stating, "This was not a delegation assembled by quota."" 4
Nonetheless, McCurry conceded that the President was anxious to establish
his credibility and good intentions among African leaders by showcasing
how the U.S., a former practitioner of slavery and racial segregation, has
"empowered people of minority backgrounds to be in authoritative positions
and policymaking roles.""'
Whether that goal was achieved is a matter of conjecture. African
sensibilities regarding African Americans are complex. For example,
according to a former U.S. ambas~ador to Kenya, "African-Americans have
the double disadvantage in African eyes of being the descendants of slaves
107 Harris, supra note 89.
'0' See Apple, supra note 91.
'09 See id.
110 See id.
1 See id.
112 id.
113 id.
114 ILd.
"3 John F. Harris, Clinton Sees Example in S. African Success; Aids Reject GOP Charge
over Entourage, WASH. PosT, Mar. 27, 1998, at A27.
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and being perceived as second-class citizens in the United States."'"16
Be that as it may, the President's goal went beyond the desire to impress
his African hosts with American multi-culturalism. In his discussion of the
travel group's diversity, McCurry insisted, "This is, in part, a delegation
assembled by interests. And there were very substantial interests, on the part
of the Congressional Black Caucus, in this trip.""'
Not all of those interests coincided with the President's desire to see his
African trade bill become law. In fact, the Black Caucus was so divided
over the legislation that it could not agree on a definitive statement for or
against it."' Thus the African trade bill has represented a rare exception
to the overall support that Clinton has enjoyed among African Americans.
The depth of that support became clear in the wake of the Monica
Lewinsky scandal, after Clinton admitted to, and apologized for, an
inappropriate relationship with the former White House intern. Despite calls
for Clinton's resignation or impeachment, a New York Times/CBS News Poll
conducted on August 19 and 20, 1998 revealed that an astounding 94% of
African Americans questioned approved of the job Clinton was doing as
President, compared with 60% of whites."19 Jack E. White, an African
American journalist who is a senior correspondent for Time had tried to
explain Clinton's phenomenal appeal among blacks to Time's readers in the
magazine's March 30, 1998 edition. He wrote:
This is a President who connects with blacks so strongly that
some of us jokingly maintain that he's only passing for
white. No President has forged such abiding personal
relationships with African Americans, or put so many in
positions of real authority. That helps explain why blacks,
more than any other group, have remained loyal to Clinton
throughout his current [Lewinsky] ordeal: we've been
treating him like one of our own.2
116 HEMPSTONE, supra note 38, at 85.
117 Apple, supra note 91.
"8 See Phillips, supra note 90.
"9 Katharine Q. Seelye, In Surprise Speech, Clinton Seeks to Forgive and Be Forgiven,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at Al.
'20 Jack E. White, My Dungeon Shook, TIME, Mar. 30, 1998, at 46, 46.
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Similar sentiments were expressed to Clinton directly by African American
leaders on August 28, 1998. The President was invited to join a 35th
anniversary celebration of the 1963 March on Washington, D.C., and Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s immortal "I Have a Dream" speech, delivered from the
steps of the Lincoln Memorial. The ceremony was held in a small church
in the Oak Bluffs section of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, where
freedmen and fugitive slaves first settled over 200 years ago. Clinton, who
was vacationing on Martha's Vineyard with his family, attended the services
along with a racially mixed crowd of some 400 people. Those in attendance
heard African American Congressman John Lewis (D-Georgia), a leader of
the student sit-in movement in the 1960s, praise the President. Lewis called
Clinton "my friend, my brother,"' 2' and declared, "I've been with you from
the beginning. And I will stand with you now till the end."
122
Charles Ogletree, Jr., a prominent African American law professor at
Harvard, assured the President, "This is not a fair-weather crowd."'
2 3
Ogletree made specific mention of Clinton's stands on such issues as
abortion, race, and health care before telling the President, "I want you to
know that the people here understand and feel your pain, believe in
redemption and are here because of you and are here with you through thick
and through thin."'2' 4
21 Clinton Honors King 'Dream' Speech, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 28, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, 1998 WL 6714889.
122 Seelye, supra note 119.
123 Clinton Honors King "Dream" Speech, supra note 121.
124 Seelye, supra note 119. A month later, in September 1998, following the death of
former Alabama governor George Wallace, Congressman Lewis returned to the theme of
redemption that Ogletree had raised in his remarks on Martha's Vineyard. In an op-ed piece
that ran in the September 16, 1998 edition of The New York Times, Lewis distinguished
redemption and forgiveness from condoning the behavior of the person who seeks to be
redeemed, and expressed his view that redemption serves a socially beneficial purpose. See
John Lewis, Editorial, Forgiving George Wallace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at A29.
George Wallace was, for example, a man who throughout the 1950s and 1960s opposed
racial integration bitterly. According to Lewis, "[a]lthough he [Wallace] never pulled a
trigger or threw a bomb, he created the climate of fear and intimidation in which those acts
were deemed acceptable." Id.
Later in his life, however, Wallace expressed remorse and sought "forgiveness from the
same African-Americans he had oppressed." Id. When Lewis met Wallace in 1979, Lewis
extended his forgiveness to him. Lewis explained:
I can never forget what George Wallace said and did as Governor, as
a national leader and as a political opportunist. But our ability to forgive
serves a higher moral purpose in our society. Through genuine repen-
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Later, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., W.E.B Du Bois professor of the humanities
and chair of the Afro-American studies department at Harvard University,
told reporters, "We are going to the wall with this president."" 2  Gates
went on, "People are acting like they want the man [Clinton] to bleed in
public, and I think he's bled enough."' 26 He concluded, "Those that want
him to do more in public have ulterior motives. ''127
Against this backdrop, any assertion that Clinton's African trade bill, or
his trip to Africa, was designed or timed to shore up his political support
among blacks for a possible impeachment battle seems ludicrous.
V. AFRICAN AMERICANS' DIVIDED REACTION TO CLINTON'S
AFRICAN TRADE POLICY
The African trade bill risked alienating segments of otherwise near
unanimous African American support for the President. On the one hand,
African Americans tend to take defiant pride in their African heritage. Any
policy that might empower Africa as a joint partner in world affairs appeals
to African Americans' desire for racial solidarity with black brothers and
sisters in the ancestral homeland. On the other hand, elected African
American representatives must respond to their own core constituencies,
which are similar to those of the Democratic party's. Most significantly, this
means organized labor. As a general rule, labor unions oppose trade
liberalization, which they see as a threat to American jobs. Democratic
leaders have responded to labor's concerns, most notably through their
consistent opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).128
tance and forgiveness, the soul of our nation is redeemed. George
Wallace deserves to be remembered for his effort to redeem his soul and
in so doing to mend the fabric of American society.
Id.
125 Seelye, supra note 119.
126 id.
2 Ceci Connolly, Clinton Talks of 'Self-Inflicted Wounds'; Commemorating King Speech,
President Speaks of Seeking, Offering Forgiveness, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at A I.
128 A comprehensive discussion of the impact, for better or worse, that NAFTA has had
on the U.S., Mexico, and Canada is beyond the scope of this article. So is an assessment of
the overall system of international economic interdependence and institutions put in place
after World War H, most notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) which administers it. For an enlightening discussion
of the GATTIWTO system and the policies that underlie modem international economic
relations, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1-39.
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Democratic opponents of the African trade bill compared it with NAFTA,
concluding that, if anything, it was even more harmful from labor's perspec-
tive. During debate over a proposed rule change that would have expedited
consideration of the African trade bill by the House, Congressman Joe
Moakley (D-Massachusetts), ranking minority member of the House Rules
Committee, declared, "[I1f my colleagues thought NAFTA was bad for
American workers' rights, if they thought NAFTA would cause irreparable
environmental damage, wait until they get a load of this African trade bill.
It looks like we have not learned anything from NAFTA's mistakes."'
29
Only 92 democrats joined 141 republicans to pass the African trade bill in
the House; 101 democrats, and one independent, opposed the legislation.
Democratic members of Congress who are black understand that they must
follow organized labor's lead or risk electoral defeat. However, this is not
to say that adhering to labor's position necessarily sacrifices personal beliefs
for the sake of political expediency. At least several members of the Black
Caucus are known to be "suspicious of free trade itself' as indeed risking
jobs and lowering wages at home by exploiting cheap labor and lax
environmental protections abroad. 30
But even members of Congress who are not philosophically opposed to
free trade recognize that in this case, liberalized trade with Africa poses a
particular threat to African American textile workers. The Wall Street
Journal has reported:
Although many African-American business executives back
the [African trade] bill, it isn't an easy call for some blacks
in the textile-rich South. That is because, among other
provisions, the bill would allow African textiles and apparel
makers free access to U.S. markets. Supporters see the
textile provision as a boost for African businesses, while
U.S. textile workers-a large portion of whom are African
Americans-see it as a threat to their jobs.'
According to the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees,
about half of all textile workers in the southern U.S. are African Ameri-
129 144 CONG. REC. H1027, H1029 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Moakley).
'30 Phillips, supra note 90.
131 id.
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can.' 32 The union predicted that if the African trade bill was enacted,
thousands of them and other workers would lose their jobs.'33 But the
U.S. International Trade Commission contradicted this assessment. A report
prepared by the commission said that at most, the bill would have put only
676 U.S. workers out of work."3
Other backers of the African trade bill pointed out that African textiles
accounted for less than 1% of the $46 billion worth of textiles and apparels
imported by the U.S. during 1996.35 They asserted that even if all duties
and quotas on African textiles were lifted, the production capacity of African
producers would limit exports to the U.S. to a maximum of only $1.2 billion
by the year 2005, an amount that is "not much in the vast U.S. economy, but
big business for [African nations such as] Kenya, Mauritius or Lesotho.' '136
However, Africans were not the only textile manufacturers that opponents
of the trade bill feared. Opponents were perhaps even more afraid of Asian
producers who might transship their textiles into the U.S. through Africa if
duties and quotas on African textiles were lifted.'37 Ordinarily, the rule of
origin principle is applied to prevent or deter transshipments. Under
NAFTA, for example, exporters are required to certify the true origin of their
goods. 3
The House version of the African trade bill would have put a more
elaborate deterrence mechanism in place. The President would have been
required to submit to Congress an annual report on the volume of African
textiles imported into the U.S. from each sub-Saharan state covered by the
African trade bill. 39 A high volume of imports disproportionate with a
132 See id.
133 See id.
'34 See id.
135 See id.
136 id.
131 "Transshipment" refers to the practice of shipping goods from one country, like China,
to a second country, such as Ghana, for shipment to a third nation, like the U.S. If the goods
were relabeled in the second nation-stamped, for example, "Made in Ghana"-Chinese
garments could be shipped into the U.S. on the pretext that they were African. Thus Chinese
textiles and apparels producers could take advantage of any duty-free treatment accorded
African textiles, or circumvent U.S. import quotas that might otherwise be applied against
Chinese goods. For a further discussion of transshipment, see James R. Cahill et al., United
States Customs and Trade Regulation: Important Issues for Clients, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. REv.
1019, 1041-43 (1998).
'38 See Cahill, supra note 137, at 1043.
" See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. § 8(c)(2) (1998).
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given state's estimated production capacity would have indicated that the
nation was engaged in transshipments. This evidence could then have been
used by the President to terminate for two years the duty-free status accorded
the offending African country."4
Furthermore, the African trade bill would have directed the President to
ensure that sub-Saharan nations had "a functioning and effective visa system
and enforcement procedures to guard against unlawful transshipment of
textile and apparel goods and the use of counterfeit documents.''.
African states covered by the trade bill would have been required to
cooperate fully with the U.S. in preventing circumvention of applicable
textile import quotas.'
The bill's supporters downplayed the potential threat to U.S. workers that
transshipments would have posed under the trade bill. During the House
debates on the bill, Congressman Howard Berman (D-California) stated,
"Opponents [of the bill] ... warn that the no-tariff, no-quota policy will
spark a massive increase in illegal transshipment of goods from Asia. While
illegal transshipment is always a concern, they again overstate the
case." 43 He emphasized, "The bill contains strong provisions to prevent
illegal transshipment."' 44
Another of the bill's backers, Congressman William Jefferson (D-
Louisiana) asked rhetorically, "Why do we say to Africa, we cannot trust
you to work with our customs people, with our government, on the
transshipments issue, when we do not say it to every other country in the
world?"' 45 He continued,
Transshipment is not [a new] issue, it is an issue as old as
time. Every time we had to do a trading arrangement, we
worried about transshipment, and every time we do that, we
deal with the transshipment question as best we can. The
African nations to me ought to be insulted by the way we
are approaching this bill, because what we are saying is we
'4 See id. at § 8(d)(2) (1998).
141 Id. at § 8(d)(1)(A) (1998).
142 See id. at § 8(d)(1)(B) (1998).
143 144 CONG. REC. H1040, H1040 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Berman).
'4 Id. at H1041 (statement of Rep. Berman).
'41 144 CONG. REC. H1027, H1034 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Jefferson).
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trust them less than we trust the rest of the world to cooper-
ate with us on transshipment questions. What is the basis
for that?14
Nevertheless, some rank-and-file textile workers felt that the African trade
bill indeed threatened their jobs. At least one African American employee
at the Pillowtex Corporation's Fieldcrest Cannon Plant in Columbus,
Georgia, said he wished that "all the congressmen would come around and
talk to textile workers and understand how we feel about losing our
jobs.' 47
Understandably, some members of the Black Caucus find themselves
"caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place-their desire to do
something meaningful for the land of their ancestors and the need to protect
the interests of the textile workers, many of them black, who are their
American constituents."'14
One African American congressman, Representative Melvin Watt (D-North
Carolina) was reportedly so distraught that for a time he refused even to
discuss his views on the legislation. His aide explained, "In essence, he
wants to support it. [But] he's elected by his constituents. He's not elected
by people in Africa. It's a very delicate issue.
1' 49
A group of prominent African Americans urged the Senate not to pass the
bill unless it was modified significantly. In an open letter to members of the
Senate, dated May 7, 1998, these leaders attacked the House version of the
bill on a number of grounds. Among other things, they criticized the
legislation as an attempt to impose a "trickle down" economic model on
Africa.150 This model, they wrote, is "based on broad privatizations of
government assets through divestiture, cuts in domestic spending and
corporate taxes, and the granting of new rights to foreign investors to acquire
African natural resources and other assets without limitation, including those
which are required to be privatized by external 'experts.' ,,' They
asserted that this model, typified by the IMF's structural adjustment program,
14 Id.
'47 Phillips, supra note 90.
John Farmer, Editorial, Africa trade bill tests black leaders, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Mar. 12, 1998, at 019.
149 Phillips, supra note 90.
'50 African Americans Urge Senate to Modify Africa Trade Bill, AFR. NEWS SERV., May
13, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Database, 1998 WL 11854326.
151 Id.
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has caused African countries significant harm.'52
Moreover, the authors of the May 7 letter complained that the African
trade bill did not adequately address the need to provide African countries
with relief from crushing foreign debt burdens. The authors warned:
Capital outflows or debt repayment from Africa exceed
capital inflows in aid and other forms of assistance. Indeed,
debt service takes more than 80% of Africa's export
earnings, and is rising. Yet, the only reference in the
[African trade] bill to debt reduction/relief is contained in a
non-binding "sense of the Congress" provision. Indeed,
even this hortatory language refers to the benefits of debt
relief for countries that meet the bill's harsh conditionalities.
Failure to address Africa's crushing debt burden belies
any serious attempt to establish a mutually beneficial
partnership with Africa.1
53
The letter called for a commitment from the Senate to forgive African debt
obligations to the U.S."5 Furthermore, it asked that the bill be amended
to require U.S. representatives to multilateral lending institutions to vote in
favor of forgiving Africa's debts to those institutions. 55 Lastly, the May
7 letter requested an amendment to the trade bill that would "stress the
importance of continued and increased aid to Africa ....
Further evidence of the extent to which the African trade bill divided the
African American community was that Reverend Jesse L. Jackson and his
'52 Id. For a discussion of the modalities for implementing economic structural adjustment
policies and the attendant problems to which those policies can give rise, see Benjamin
Lubinda Ngenda, Comparative Models of Privatization: A Commentary on the African
Experience, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179 (1995).
153 African Americans Urge Senate to Modify Africa Trade Bill, supra note 150.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 Id. The letter's signatories included, among others: Dr. Mary Frances Berry, former
director of the United States Civil Rights Commission; actors Danny Glover and Robert
Guillaume; Coretta Scott King, widow of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; Harvard Law School
professor Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.; Harvard University professor Cornell West; United States
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun; and United States Representatives John Conyers, Danny Davis,
Ronald V. Dellums, Bobby Rush, Louis Stokes, and Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. Id.
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son, Representative Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. (D-Illinois), found themselves on
different sides of the issue. The Reverend Jackson, in his capacity as
President Clinton's unofficial special envoy to Africa, supported the House
version of the bill while his son opposed it.
The May 7 letter was signed by Randall Robinson, president of TransAfri-
ca, which is regarded as the most influential lobbying group on Capitol Hill
for African and Caribbean affairs. According to Robinson, the African trade
bill provided little more than the means by which white business interests
could exploit cheap African labor. Robinson told one commentator, "This
bill can be manipulated so that it means nothing to the average African." 157
He continued, "It [the African trade bill] may even do incalculable damage
in stopping African-based development. Many African countries embrace it
because they see it as all or nothing. But just as Africa was colonized
physically, it is now about to undergo de facto economic colonization."'58
Furthermore, Robinson has criticized the Clinton administration for failing
to adequately address concerns about human rights violations in sub-Saharan
Africa. Robinson has used oil-rich Nigeria, the most populous African state,
as an example. In Nigeria a military regime has nullified free elections, and
in November 1995, hanged poet Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nobel laureate, for his
environmental activism and opposition to military rule. 59 Robinson has
called upon the U.S. to impose an embargo on Nigerian oil. He told an
interviewer, "All we [in the U.S.] have done is issue the toothless rhetoric
of condemnation. The only language the Nigerian leaders will understand
is oil sanctions, but there is no hint of any.,,6o By one estimate, Nigeria
supplies about a tenth of the oil used for gasoline in the United States.'6'
Robinson also has charged the U.S. government and American business
interests with complicity in the civil war that brought Laurent Kabila to
power in the newly renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly
Zaire. 62  Kabila's dictatorial predecessor Mobuto Sese Seko was ousted
157 Derrick Z. Jackson, Editorial, A Warning Against the Latest U.S. Bid to Exploit Africa,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1998, at A27.
15, id.
159 For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Ken Saro-Wiwa's execution and the
international condemnations of Nigeria which followed it, see Howard W. French, Nigeria
Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at § 1, 1. See also
William Boyd, In Memoriam: Death of a Writer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 27, 1995, at 51.
16 Jackson, supra note 157.
161 See id.
62 See id.
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by several groups of rebels including Kabila in 1997.163 Since then, Congo
has been a battleground of warring factions divided into Angolan and
Rwandan-Ugandan spheres of influence. 64 Meanwhile, the war against
Mobuto's forces has spilled across the Congolese border and threatens to
engulf neighboring countries. 65
To Robinson, allegedly complicitous American conduct in Congo is part
of an on going pattern of subversive, destabilizing intervention in the
internal affairs of African states. He has written, "[W]hat the United States
has done to Zaire and much of Africa--done with gloves so as to leave no
fingerprints-is unpardonable." He asserts:
Zairians, Somalis, Liberians, Angolans, Sudanese, Kenyans
appear to have destroyed their own societies without
accomplices. No news account fingers point at the Ameri-
can partners who comment coolly and with reasoned
detachment on the wreckage they have wrought ....
Americans, black and white, have only gotten to see the
mute husks of failed African nation states.' 66
These and similar assertions may or may not be wholly accurate or
altogether fair.
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
AFRICAN TRADE POLICY
There are valid reasons for criticizing, or at least questioning, the validity
of the assumptions upon which the Clinton administration's African trade
policy is based.
The characterization of what is now occurring in Africa as a "renaissance"
inspired by a generation of "new leaders" committed to democratization and
free market principles is somewhat misleading.1 67 On one hand, a younger
"~ See James Rupert, Barely Alive Amid the Ruins, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at A14.
"4 See id.
165 See id.
' Jackson, supra note 157 (quoting Randall Robinson).
167 Africa: The New Princes Fall Out, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1998, at 43, 43 (defining
"new leaders" as an "America-invented term for the military princes" who "were supposed
to be cleaning up the [African] continent and leading it into the 21st century.").
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leadership appears to have emerged to replace the so-called "toad kings" who
were their dictatorial predecessors. 6  The trend began two decades ago
when Jerry Rawlings and the late Thomas Sankara came to power in Ghana
and Burkina Faso, respectively. 69 Since then, men such as Meles Zenawi
of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul
Kagame of Rwanda, and Laurent Kabila of Congo, have likewise replaced
despotic regimes that were often propped up by the United States, the former
Soviet Union, or the former European colonial powers.
The toad kings, including the likes of Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean-Bedel
Bokassa of the Central African Republic, Kenya's Daniel arap Moi,
Cameroon's Paul Biya, and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, gave sub-Saharan
African leadership an image of brutality and profligacy. As some observers
have pointed out, "[t]he legacy of their generation is obscene.' 70  The
following facts speak for themselves:
Among Sub-Saharan Africa's 590 million people, almost
half live on less than one dollar a day and lack safe drinking
water. More than one-third have no health care. Tuberculo-
sis, malaria, hepatitis, and AIDS run rampant, and preventive
measures are minimal. Nearly half the adult population is
illiterate, and worker productivity in most countries is
among the lowest anywhere. Africa's aggregate per capita
income is lower than that of any region but south Asia. In
fact, under the last generation of rulers, the continent grew
poorer with every passing decade. Even if Africa's aggre-
gate growth doubles over the next nine years, its per capita
income in 2006 would still be five percent lower than it was
in 1974.17 1
Moreover, as their nations grew ever more aid-dependent, the toad kings
enriched themselves at their people's expense. 172 The late Stokely Carmi-
168 Id.
'69 See Hunter R. Clark, A Tale of Two Countries, TIME, May 27, 1985, at 30, 30
(discussing the emergence of Rawlings in Ghana and the late Thomas Sankara in Burkina
Faso).
170 Dan Connell & Frank Smyth, Africa's New Bloc, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
80, 89.
171 id.
172 See Africa: The New Princes Fall Out, supra note 167.
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chael, a devoted pan-Africanist whose call for "Black Power" inspired
American black militancy in the U.S. in the 1960s, left the United States in
1969 for the promised land of Africa. He changed his name to Kwame
Ture, and took up residence in the People's Revolutionary Republic of
Guinea. Exasperated by the behavior of the continent's rulers, he offered a
dismal assessment of African leadership shortly before his death from cancer
in 1998. He told a reporter, "Leaders in Africa are so corrupt that we are
certain if we put dogs in uniforms and put guns on their shoulders, we'd be
hard put to distinguish them."'
7
Yet even the new leaders, while "far more responsive, accountable, and
egalitarian than any of their predecessors," resist guidance on democracy,
and take a cultural relativist stance on human rights. 174 "Cultural relativ-
ism" is a doctrine which justifies "departure from human rights standards in
international law on cultural grounds.' 75 According to one expert,
Cultural relativism is essentially an anthropological and
sociological concept loosely grounded in the theory of moral
relativism. The notion is that cultures manifest so wide and
diverse a range of preferences, morality, motivations, and
evaluations that no human rights principles can be said to be
self-evident and recognized in all times and all places.
Moral relativism is not very influential in modern philoso-
phy, but cultural relativism has been used frequently as an
argument against the universality of human rights.
Cultural relativists, in their most aggressive conceptual
stance, argue that no human rights are absolutes, that the
principles that one may use for judging behavior are relative
to the society in which one is raised, that there is infinite
cultural variability, and that all cultures are morally equal or
valid. Put into philosophical calculus, the relativist says that
"truth is just for a time or place" identified by the standards
of one's cultural peers. Relativism thus shifts the touch-
173 Paula Span, The Undying Revolutionary: As Stokely Carmichael, He Fought for Black
Power. Now Kwame Ture's Fighting for His Life, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1998, at D1.
'7" Connell & Smyth, supra note 170, at 94.
175 Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HuM. RTs. Q.
201, 228 (1998). Mr. Shestack is a past president of the American Bar Association and
former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
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stones by which to measure the worth of human rights
practice. To suggest that fundamental rights may be
overridden or adjusted in light of cultural practices is to
challenge the underlying moral justification of a universal
system of human rights, reflecting the autonomous individu-
al nature of the human being. 76
The new leaders may be characterized appropriately as pragmatists who
have given up on Marxism but are still distrustful of capitalists. They are
committed to political and social reform but believe that democratization
must take a back-seat to economic development. By one assessment, they
have "introduced market reforms plus a measure of democracy, though not
on a western model."' 77 To say that they have brought about an African
"renaissance" is probably an overstatement. Most troubling is that they seem
inclined to engage in regional military interventions for motives that are not
readily apparent to outside observers. 7
Because the new leaders seem to desire good relations with the West, the
U.S. has tried to accommodate them. For example, at the Entebbe Summit
for Peace and Prosperity, President Clinton won a stated commitment to
democratization from the rulers of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Ghana. 9 At the same time, however, the African leaders
received a promise from the President that the U.S. will "pursue a dialogue
on democratization that ... recognizes that there is no fixed model for
democratic institutions or transformation; explores alternative approaches to
the democratic management of cultural diversity; and takes into account
differences in historical experience."'180
This suggests that future dialogue with the U.S. over democratization and
human rights will be premised on the validity of the cultural relativist point
of view. As one U.S. government official put it during Clinton's Africa trip,
"It's not that we have a double standard. It's that we have varying standards
176 Id. (citations omitted).
17 Africa: The New Princes Fall Out, supra note 167, at 43.
178 See generally id. (describing conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea).
'79 For a discussion of the Entebbe joint declaration of principles, see supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
'80 Communique: Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity, supra note 59, at 501.
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based on historical context."' 8'1
Regardless of the context, the fundamental assumption that Africa can both
be democratized and saved economically through even the most enlightened
trade and foreign investment policies is an open question. The sheer scale
and extent of the subcontinent's suffering, poverty and deprivation may be
beyond the capacity of those whose most heart-felt desire is to improve the
situation. Some scholars even question whether the states of Africa can
survive as they currently exist. One scholar applied the precepts of John
Rawls' political liberalism to Africa's modem post-colonial era.182  His
conclusion was that "even under the fairly conservative notion of Rawls'
philosophy, the viability of the post-colonial state in Africa remains highly
doubtful."'8 3
Africa's former colonial rulers are blamed for drawing the boundaries
among African nations in a way that makes it impossible for African states
to achieve within their disparate populations the kind of constitutionalism of
consensus that would create tolerance and stability. African leaders are
criticized for "inaction, continued civil strife, cross-border interventionism
and periodic genocidal wars" which are interpreted as modem extensions of
Il James C. McKinley Jr., A New Model for Africa: Good Leaders Above All, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A14. See also Thomas W. Lippman, Albright Treads Carefully
Among African Leaders, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at A24 (describing a 1997 visit by U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to various African nations). The author states:
[A]II around Africa last week, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
has been pulling her punches a bit on democracy and human rights.
It isn't that she has failed to stress U.S. support for individual rights
and political freedom-she has, at every stop, urged leaders to turn away
from repressive practices.
But that message has been tempered by an acknowledgment that even
the most forward-looking African leaders are fighting for political and
economic survival, and Washington is willing to cut them some slack.
"Those who would build democratic institutions and market-based
economies ... face tremendous obstacles; societies weakened by
protracted and brutal conflicts, devastated government institutions and the
legacies of authoritarian rule," Albright said in the keynote speech of her
seven-nation tour.
Id.
182 See Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: A Rawlsian
Approach, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1301 (1997). See also JoHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993).
183 Dore, supra note 182, at 1301.
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intolerant tribalism.' It has been suggested that African states which are
in a dysfunctional state of collapse should be replaced by regional confedera-
tions organized "along appropriate ethnic and cultural lines."' 5  One
suggested solution would be for the advanced African states to form an
African Security Council that would assume responsibility for maintaining
continental peace and security.
I1 6
Other people are more sanguine. Most notable among them is South
African president Nelson Mandela. Mandela believes that increased trade
and foreign direct investment can and do have a crucial role to play in
achieving African political stability and prosperity. In 1993, before he
assumed the South African presidency, Mandela published in Foreign Affairs
an article that made clear his views as to the direction South African foreign
policy should take under the ensuing rule of his party, the African National
Congress ("ANC"). He wrote with eloquence about the key role that trade
and foreign investment would play:
It is obvious to me that the primary components of our
international economic relations, which must feed our
development strategy, are the strengthening of our trade
performance and our capacity to attract foreign investment.
In addition we must examine the possibilities of obtaining
technical and financial assistance from the developed
industrialised countries. We do not expect foreign invest-
ment to solve our economic problems, but we understand
that it can play a very valuable role in our economic
development.
The ANC believes the most important way to attract
foreign investment is to create a stable and democratic
political environment. Also important is the development of
legitimate, transparent and consistent economic policies.
Foreign companies should be treated as domestic companies,
obeying our laws and gaining access to our incentives, and
the ANC is committed to the principle of uniform treatment.
And while we do not plan to provide exclusive incentives
'84 Id. at 1317.
'" Id. at 1318.
"86 See id. at 1318.
[Vol. 27:265
AFRICAN "RENAISSANCE"
for all foreign investors, we realize it might be necessary to
make special arrangements to attract the kind of investment
that will make a real difference in South Africa. 8
7
Because this declaration is consistent with the principles embodied in the
African trade bill, the Clinton administration has endeavored to make South
Africa the centerpiece of its African trade policy. On March 26, 1998,
Clinton told the South African parliament, "America has a profound and
pragmatic stake in your success, an economic stake because we, like you,
need strong partners to build prosperity."'' 8 8 He emphasized, "[s]imply put,
America wants a strong South Africa; America needs a strong South Africa.
And we are determined to work with you as you build a strong South
Africa."'
18 9
The two countries do not, however, agree on all matters. During Clinton's
March 1998 visit to South Africa, Mandela made clear that South Africa is
determined to pursue its own independent foreign policy. This includes
maintaining friendly ties with nations like Libya, Iran, and Cuba, which the
U.S. considers rogue regimes. 9° Mandela rejected out of hand any trade
agreement with the U.S. that would limit South Africa's transactions with
other countries, declaring "we resist any attempt by any country to impose
conditions on our freedom of trade."'' Such differences may explain the
failure of U.S. and South Africa to reach agreement on a bilateral investment
treaty.
Moreover, South African deputy president Thabo Mbeki, who will likely
succeed Mandela as president in 1999, expressed his view during Clinton's
'87 Nelson Mandela, South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 86, 95 (1993).
'u Address by the President to the Parliament of South Africa in. Cape Town, 34 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. DoC. 509, 510 (March 26, 1998).
'89 Id. See also Albright Says South Africa Is a Model for Ties With U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1997, at 6 ("Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright today held up the United
States' relationship with South Africa as an example of the type of ties it wants with countries
across Africa.").
'90 See R.W. Apple, Jr., From Mandela, a Gentle Admonishment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1998, at Al.
'9' Charles William Maynes, The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America, 111 FOREIGN
POL'Y 36, 44 (1998). In contrast to South Africa's commitment to trade with all nations, the
U.S. has, since 1993, imposed, or threatened to impose, unilateral economic sanctions 60
times against 35 nations that represent over 40% of the world's total population. See id.
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visit that "[T]he formula: trade, not aid, is wrong."'' 92 He explained, "The
[South African] economy today cannot generate the resources that are
required to address all those urgent problems of poverty which face us.' 93
Foreign aid is an emotive issue across Africa and threats to remove or
replace it will spur fear and resentment.' 94
When he visited Clinton at the White House in September 1998, Mandela
echoed Mbeki's sentiments, emphasizing his nation's need for continued
assistance. He called it a "grave injustice" to judge South Africa's economic
performance by western standards, reminding his audience, "We have parents
who have never seen the inside of a school, who cannot write their
names."'9" He went on, "Suddenly, without any previous training, they
[the South African people] are called upon to run a developed country with
modem ports and harbors, with modem communications . . . with a
sophisticated banking and financial system."'196 He concluded, "Judge us
from the background from which we come ... We came from years in
prison, from the bush, from exile and from the underground."' 9
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, even this brief analysis suggests ways in which the Clinton
administration's African trade policy should be modified.
First, the argument that Africa is in need of debt relief in addition to the
kind of development incentives contained in the African trade bill is
compelling. So is the view that Africa will remain aid dependent for some
time to come. Therefore, the U.S. should work toward obtaining meaningful
debt relief for hard-pressed African countries. Also, the U.S. should soften
its "trade, not aid" stance and commit to continued assistance to Africa
where it would be useful and is needed.
Second, the notion that Africa's new leaders have or are on the verge of
precipitating an African renaissance should not be overstated. The new
leaders are pragmatic men whose commitment to democratization, human
'" Nicholas Shaxson, South Africa Criticises U.S. Trade Policy as Clinton visits,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 26, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS
Database.
193 id.
'94 See id.
'95 Mandela Won't Desert Clinton, WASH. PosT, Sept. 23, 1998, at All.
1% Id.
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rights, and free market principles is tempered by their cultural relativism.
Nonetheless, there is promise in their ascendance and hope can be drawn
from the demise of the toad kings they replaced.
Africa's new leaders may have no choice but to move their nations along
the development path prescribed by the U.S. In both the U.S. and the EU,
domestic political support for foreign aid is diminishing. Also, attitudes have
changed now that colonialism, the Cold War, and apartheid have ended.
Today, the rest of the world feels freer to expect more from Africa in terms
of the role it plays as a joint partner in world affairs. In the years ahead,
more will be expected from African leaders in terms of how they manage
their economies, and treat their people.
To the extent that all of this is true, the Clinton administration's African
trade policy, as embodied in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, with
some changes, is visionary, wise, and well-intentioned.

